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1 Introduction 
Despite the effects of 9/11 and SARS1, air traffic is growing worldwide. The IATA2 
Passenger Forecast expects international passenger traffic to increase at an average of 5.6% a 
year between 2005 and 2009.3 Due to this development, however, capacity shortages and 
congestion result at many airports worldwide.4 
The current slot allocation regimes were developed in a regulated air traffic environment 
decades ago. While deregulation of air traffic can be considered as almost completed both in 
the US and the EU, a fundamental reform of slot allocation has not taken place yet. An 
efficient and discrimination-free allocation of airport capacity is, however, essential to 
guarantee competition in the downstream market for air traffic services.5 
Lately, some impetus towards reforms can be observed. The European Commission already 
suggested a two-phase reform in 2001.6 While phase one, aimed at optimising the 
administrative allocation process, has been completed with the adoption of Regulation EC 
793/2004 on 21st April 2004, phase two is to consider a shift towards market based 
instruments. A decision toward a specific instrument is yet not reached.7  
In light of this, the paper on hand contains an analysis of different slot allocation regimes. In 
section two an analysis of the status quo will be given. Section three considers possible 
market-based solutions. These include congestion fees, auctions and secondary trading. The 
US example in slot trading will also be analysed. Section four compares the three instruments 
including positive economic analysis. The paper ends with a conclusion and an outlook. 
 
2 The Current Slot Allocation Regimes 
Airlines require access to airport infrastructure in order to offer their services. Two different 
slot8 allocation mechanisms exist worldwide: the IATA- Approach, which is the basis for slot 
allocation in the EU and most other countries, and the US- Approach. 
                                                 
1 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
2 International Air Transport Association 
3 See IATA (2005a). 
4 See AEA and IATA data and also Wendlik (1995), p. 165; Wolf (2003), pp. 62 ff. 
5 See Hardaway (1986), p. 14. 
6 See European Commission (2001a) and (2001b). 
7 In September 2004 the European Commission launched a consultation on the subject. The responses are now 
being analysed. On the basis of this consultation the commission is preparing a communication, setting out 
issues regarding modification of the slot regime. See European Commission (2005a) and (2005b), p. 6. 
8 An airline requires access to a bundle of facilities, such as runways, gates and aprons. These facilities can be 
considered to 100% as compliments. A suitable definition of a slot must therefore include these facilities. 
This paper, however, primarily focuses on the award of take-off and landing rights. 
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Slots in the US are allocated on a first-come first-serve basis – reserving take-off and landing 
rights in advance is currently impossible.9 This allocation system leads to economic 
inefficiencies, as it is inadequate to deal with the current high level of airport traffic. As slot 
demand is rationed by queuing, delays will arise at a non-optimal level once demand outstrips 
airport capacity. This is because an airline´s decision to use capacity is based solely upon its 
own delay costs, and does not take into account the external congestion costs it imposes on all 
other airlines.10 
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Figure 1: Inefficiencies caused by negative externalities. 
Source: Author. 
Figure 1 shows that the quantity of take-off´s and landings will be too high (xext) because of 
this externality. A price that would internalise congestion would reduce the quantity to an 
optimal level (xopt). Area A equals welfare loss due to external congestion costs. 
An exception to the allocation mechanism described above within the US is the so-called 
“High Density Rule” at four American airports, introduced by US regulators in 1968.11 Until 
1985, the allocation process was dealt with within the regulatory administrative process. Any 
reallocation was bound by the agreement of all airlines at a given airport.12 Beginning in 
1986, with the introduction of the “Buy-Sell Rule”, banks, airlines and other interested 
institutions have been permitted to trade slots on an open secondary market.13  
                                                 
9 See Starkie (2003), p. 53. 
10 See Czerny and Tegner (2002), p. 9 and generally Baumol and Oats (1988). 
11 FAR 14 CFR §93 subpart K; also see GAO (1998), p. 4; Hardaway (1986), p. 4. 
12 See Sened and Riker (1996), pp. 429 ff.; Kleit and Kobayashi (1996) pp. 3 ff. 
13 See section 3.3. 
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Council Regulation (EEC) 95/93 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community 
airports forms the legal frame for the award of slots in the European Union. It is based on 
guidelines set by IATA.14 The aim stated in the directive is to provide efficient use and non-
discriminatory access to airport slots.15 The core of the directive is an administrative 
allocation of slots by a fixed priority order.16 The most important award criterion is the 
historical right, the so-called Grandfather Right. This means that an airline has the right to use 
slots it was assigned at the same time during the preceding equivalent season.17 In other 
words, once an airline gets a surcharge, it keeps the right as long as it uses it.  
The advantage of the present directive is that the complexity connected to an allocation 
regime is handled well. Grandfather rights reduce the number of slots to be newly allocated in 
every flight schedule period to a minimum, since the largest part of user rights is simply 
passed on to the next period. For incumbent airways a large degree of planning safety is 
reached, which makes investment decisions easier. 
The European slot allocation approach does, however, not conform to the criteria of economic 
efficiency. Firstly, the scarce airport capacity is not used by those airlines who value it most 
(allocative inefficiency).18 The present allocation system is orientated at historical priority and 
not at willingness to pay. Secondly, competition in the downstream market of airline services 
is prohibited (competitive inefficiency).19 Incumbent airways have an incentive to hoard slots 
to prevent market entrances and can do so almost free of charge. In addition, the regulation is 
to be judged as infrastructurially inefficient since scarcity rents do not fall to the airports who 
could enlarge capacity by investments.20 
Therefore, in the next section, market-based approaches are introduced that can potentially 
lead to an efficient allocation of and a discrimination-free access to airport capacity. 
 
3 Market-based approaches 
Because of the problems described above, the introduction of efficient allocation instruments 
is urgently required to fully exploit the competition potentials in the air traffic sector. For the 
allocation of slots three market mechanisms seem appropriate: 
                                                 
14 See IATA (2005b). 
15 See EEC 95/93, preface. 
16 See EEC 95/93, article 8. 
17 See EEC 95/93, article 8, paragraph 1a. 
18 See e.g. Nera (2003), p. 22. 
19 See Knieps (1996a), pp. 4 ff. 
20 See Ewers et al. (2001), p. 10. 
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1. Optimal user charges 
2. Auctions 
3. Secondary trading 
Optimal user charges and auctions are instruments for a primary allocation of slots. Slot 
trading is a secondary mechanism which can improve efficiency by correcting an inefficient 
primary allocation. It can be used in conjunction to administrative and market instruments.21 
An optimal user charge must be set to a level that elevates supply and demand. The market 
mechanism endogenously determines the optimal number of take-offs and landings. A 
reversed procedure is carried out for auctions and slot trading. Here, the capacity is 
determined exogenously while the market mechanism determines the market price. The 
market mechanisms introduced here aim to assign a slot to the airline with the highest 
willingness to pay. If willingness to pay and aggregate benefit correlate, an efficient allocation 
is secured. This is assumed from hereon. 22 
 
3.1 Optimal user charges 
The current airport charges are mainly cost-related and set to finance airport capacity.23 If fees 
are to be used for the allocation of scarce resources, the relationship to cost must be abolished. 
Efficient congestion fees have already been developed in economic literature since the 
beginning of the 20th century. The focus of this work lay on efficient fees for the use of road 
infrastructure.24 A transfer of these results to airport infrastructure is principally possible and 
was done by Morrisson (1983), e.g. 
Airport fees should reflect marginal costs resulting from additional flights - costs affecting the 
airport and the operations of other airlines. This includes the marginal costs of runway use and 
delays. The fee should be determined by the time an aircraft intends to take-off or land, and 
differentiate between take-offs and landings by different user categories.25 Optimal congestion 
fee and capacity must be determined simultaneously to achieve efficiency.26 It can be shown 
that optimal capacity occurs when the savings in delay costs of all users during all time 
periods due to additional airport capacity equal the cost of that capacity.27 If excess demand 
exists even with congestion costs built into airport fees, a mark-up is necessary to the level 
                                                 
21 See Nera (2003), p. 29. 
22 For a dissenting opinion, see Borenstein (1988). 
23 Some incentives e.g. for the reduction of aircraft noise exist, however. See for an Overview on current 
charges: Wendlik (1995), p. 157; Giesberts and Geisler (1998), p. 36; Doganis (1992), pp. 62 ff. 
24 See Pigou (1912); Walters (1961); Mohring and Harwitz (1962). 
25 See Morrison and Winston (1989), p. 10. 
26 See Knieps (1993), p. 9. 
27 See Morrison and Winston (1989), p. 112. 
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required to correlate supply with demand. This mark-up reflects economic rent due to scarcity 
of airport capacity.28  
Morrison and Winston (1989) estimate the annual net benefit of the introduction of time-
variable charges in the USA at a simultaneously determined optimal investment level to at 
least 11 billion dollars.29 The sole introduction of optimal charges would save at least 3.82 
billion dollars. These results have validity under the assumption of a complete deregulation of 
the air traffic sector. The net benefit would increase by 1.15 billion dollars in a regulated 
environment, assuming a 20% lower traffic volume. The considerable net profits can be 
explained by a great discrepancy between present weight based and optimal user charges. 
Because capacity should only be increased until the use corresponds to costs, delays will 
persist even with optimal charges and infrastructure.30 Another interesting result of the study 
shows that the sole elevation of optimal user charges leads to considerably stronger 
distribution effects than the introduction of optimal charges at an optimal investment level.31 
An examination of the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) also shows how big the 
discrepancy turns out to be between present and optimal charges.32 Airport charges per 
passenger at the London airports Heathrow and Gatwick must be increased by approx. 150% 
to bring supply and demand into harmony. The distribution effect is a shift of the scarcity rent 
from the airline companies to the airports or the state.  
Brueckner (2002a, 2002b and 2005) stresses that congestion fees derived from road pricing 
might not be transferable to the airport sector without modification. This is because 
passengers use airlines for transportation and do not appear as atomistic users of 
infrastructure.33 To illustrate the consequences of this fact, one could assume an airline 
possessing market power at a specific airport. Furthermore, the airline should be the exclusive 
user of the given airport. Because an airline will maximise its overall profit, it would 
internalise the congestion externality resulting from all of its airplanes. Thus, in our extreme 
case, all delay costs would be included in the profit maximization. Brueckner therefore argues 
that a congestion fee should only include the remaining congestion costs that are not born by 
airplanes of the same airline.34 
Another specific feature of the airline sector that might limit the transferability of road pricing 
models has been analysed by Mayer und Sinai (2002). They argue that most delays are not 
                                                 
28 See Knieps (1993), pp. 6 ff. 
29 See Morrison and Winston (1989), p. 84 and pp. 92 ff. 
30 See Morrison and Winston (1989), p. 94. 
31 See Morrison and Winston (1989), p. 93. 
32 See CAA (1989), Appendix 9. 
33 See Brueckner (2002a), pp. 143 ff. 
34 Brueckner (2002a), p. 146. 
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caused by delay externalities but by positive network effects at hub airports. The existing 
delays may present an equilibrium solution of the marginal benefit of the hub-effect and the 
marginal cost of delay.35 Since network airlines can only exhaust network effects if 
passengers have feasible transfer times, they will bundle all flights at hub-periods while other 
airlines can use different time periods. Therefore network airlines will bear most delay cost at 
hub-periods.36 Mayer and Sinai (2002) conclude that congestion fees will not have much 
influence on delays and might even result in welfare loss, since positive network effects are 
not taken into consideration.37 
Optimal airport fees can, in theory, internalise the congestion externality, optimally allocate 
airport capacity, and stimulate competition in the downstream market of airline services by 
insuring non-discriminatory access for all airlines. There exists, however, a major obstacle to 
an optimal airport fee structure. Information about the position of airline´s demand curves are 
highly imperfect. 38  This is illustrated in the following graph: 
D1
D
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QD(P1) D(P2)
P2
D2
underused capacity excess demand
Quantity of aircraft
movement
Price per
aircraft
movement
 
Q = Airport Capacity, D = True demand, D 1; D2 = Imagined demand 1 / 2 
Figure 2: Market Clearing Prices. 
Source: In analogy to Jones and Viehoff (1993), p. 6. 
If demand is incorrectly assumed to be higher than it actually is, airport fees would be set too 
high with underused capacity as a consequence. If imagined demand were below true demand, 
prices would be set too low and excess demand would continue. Because of a periodic 
resetting of prices on the basis of observed outcomes a convergence towards the efficient 
market clearing level, P, could be assumed. However, in reality, all sorts of external influence 
can be found resulting in constant shifts in the true demand.39 
 
                                                 
35 See Mayer and Sinai (2002), p. 2. 
36 See Mayer and Sinai (2002), p. 3. 
37 See Mayer and Sinai (2002), p. 35. 
38 See Wolf (1999), p. 10; Jones and Viehoff (1993), pp. 6 ff.; Nera (2003), pp. 41 ff. 
39 See Jones and Viehoff (1993), p. 7. 
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3.2 Auctions 
Due to the information problems arising when setting optimal user charges auctions are often 
suggested as an alternative pricing method.40 Auctions establish a price at which demand 
equals supply, thus assuring that the airline with the highest willingness to pay receives the 
slot. In addition, price signals can create incentives for the change between peak and off-peak 
periods. Since auctions can find prices for congestion and scarcity, information about the 
optimal investment level is revealed.41 Condition for an auctioning of airport slots is the 
withdrawal of grandfather rights. The competitive advantage of established airlines would be 
lost, a discrimination-free access to the airport infrastructure guaranteed. Slot auctions can 
both accompany congestion fees by determining the scarcity surcharge required for market 
clearance and be used for the determination of the complete optimal user charges. 
The auctioning of airport slots is, however, highly complex and extremely demanding of the 
auction design.42 Firstly, airport capacity is not an external variable, but depends on variables 
such as the mix of aircraft and the order of take-offs and landings.43 Secondly, actual capacity 
is not an exogenous variable but depends on factors such as the airplane mix, the sequence of 
take-offs and landings and the flight approach direction.44 Also, airlines need access to a 
broad array of infrastructural components. Therefore, without knowing how airlines intend to 
use a slot, the capacity cannot be calculated.45 The use of small aircraft could, for example, 
lead to scarce runway capacity while the use of larger aircraft can lead to terminal and stand 
scarcity. Airport slots are highly complementary; an airline needs at least one take-off and one 
corresponding landing slot to offer a service.46 With slots allocated by auctions, an airline 
faces the risk of receiving only a single slot without the corresponding take-off or landing 
right. Also, an airline must transfer the value it places on a route or even a network to values 
of individual slots. A last problem stems from the requirement, that any auction process must 
be compatible with the IATA Time Schedule. An auction model must therefore assure a 
termination at a given time.47 
As with congestion fees, auction models for airport slots have been suggested by economic 
scholars for quite a while. In the following, four prominent auction models will be presented 
and compared briefly. 
                                                 
40 See e.g. Wolf (1999), pp. 10 ff., Jones and Viehoff (1993), pp. 7 ff.; Cornelius (1994), pp. 143 ff. 
41 See Boyfield (2003), p. 41. 
42 See Wolf (1995), pp. 20 ff. 
43 See Urbatzka (1991), pp. 15 ff. 
44 See Urbatzka (1991), pp. 15 ff. 
45 See Nera (2003), p. 34; DotEcon (2002), pp. 46 ff. 
46 See Balinski and Sand (1985), p. 182; DotEcon (2002), pp. 46 ff. 
47 See Wolf (1995), p. 21. 
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Grether, Isaac and Plott (1989) [GIP] already developed an auction model for the American 
Civil Aeronautical Board (CAB) in 1979.48 The allocation of take-off and landing rights is 
carried out in a two-step proceeding. In a first step, slots are being auctioned using a uniform-
price auction. Airlines receive full property rights for a duration of six months. After that a 
new auction is carried out.49 The auctions take place independently for all airports. The 
problem of complementarity is taken into account in the second step by the establishment of a 
secondary market. This shall be organized as an anonymous, centralised computer trade.50  
Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin (1982) [RSB] choose a second price sealed bid combinatorial 
auction as auction form. The airport capacity is determined exogenously and all slots are 
auctioned simultaneously. The problem of interdependency is taken into consideration by two 
measures. Firstly, the airlines can place conditional bids for whole slot packages. An 
individual bid is only binding when the bids of the other slots were also successful. Secondly, 
a bid for a slot package can be linked to the successful acquisition of a further slot package. 
This measure secures that only routes or networks that are useful for an airline are aquired and 
no valueless individual slots.51 The auction is completed after one round. The price to be paid 
for a slot package is determined by the marginal "shadow prices" of the individual slots, these 
are calculated from the conditional bids52 with the help of an algorithm developed by RSB.53 
The missing practicability of the RSB system was the starting point for the development of a 
"second best” auction model by Wolf (1995). A simultaneous auctioning of all slots is 
rejected because of high transaction costs. Instead, the efficiency losses which arise from a 
deviation from a "first best” auction model shall be minimised.54 The English auction is 
chosen as an auction format because of its high degree of information disclosure. To further 
deal with the problem of complementarity, airlines may combine complementary slots into 
"cores" and bid on these packages.55 Bidding on individual slots is also possible. To determine 
the winner, the highest bid on a "core" must be compared to the sum of the highest bids on 
individual slots. Because the maximum capacity of an airport also depends on the mix of the 
airplane types and movements, charges dependent on the duration of the flight movement are 
levied in addition to the auction price. To safeguard a punctual auction end, one last auction 
round is carried out after expiry of a "regular auction time". The auction format chosen for 
                                                 
48 See Grether, Isaac and Plott (1981), p. 171, references and Cornelius (1994), p. 172. 
49 See Grether, Isaac and Plott (1989), p. 69. 
50 See Grether, Isaac and Plott (1989), pp. 56 ff. 
51 See Hüschelrath (1998), p. 325. 
52 See Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin (1982), p. 404. 
53 See Wolf (1995), p. 28. 
54 See Wolf (1995), p. 35. 
55 See Wolf (1995), p. 45. 
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this is a second price auction.56 For the auction sequence a decentralized solution is suggested 
which should grant the airlines the right to determine autonomously when to bring specific 
slots into an auction. Every slot must be auctioned at least once within a specified time period 
though.57 For the correction of the primary allocation a secondary market is recommended. A 
specification on a certain institutional form is declined.58 
The auction model of DotEcon (2002) 59 suggests a Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction 
format (SMRA).60 For the definition of a slot DotEcon (2002) recommends defining a time 
period between 15 and 30 minutes as a window. Within this base unit (lot) the coordination of 
the individual slots shall be left to air traffic control.61 The airplane mix and the routing 
direction shall be taken into account since these influence the capacity. Terminal and stand 
capacity, as potential bottleneck factors, shall also be included.62 A bidder hands in a 
composite bid containing both willingness to pay and information about usage, e.g. whether 
take-off or landing, which direction, size and maximum passenger load factor are planned.63 
After every auction round the auctioneer selects those bidders who generate the highest value 
of a lot under consideration of capacity and usage factors.64 The auctioneer then sets 
minimum bids for the next round, arising from the highest bids plus a surcharge.65 The 
auction is completed if, for all lots, no more bids are made. A stop rule is suggested in form of 
a concealed second price auction.66 The combined auctioning of whole slot packages is 
rejected in the model because the complexities connected to this and transaction costs seem 
too high to the authors.67 Corrections could, if necessary, be made over a secondary market 
which shall be organized centrally.68  
It can be concluded that the GIP model seems least suitable for an efficient allocation of 
airport slots. This is because it neglects the problem of complementarity at the primary 
allocation as well as endogenous factors of capacity determination. Terminal and stand 
capacities are also neglected. Although, in theory, the RSB model can produce an efficient 
allocation by consideration of complementarities, it imposes high transaction costs. 
                                                 
56 See Wolf (1995), p. 48. 
57 See Wolf (1995), pp. 52 ff. 
58 See Wolf (1995), pp. 53 ff. 
59 The model was developed for HM Treasury and the Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions. 
60 See DotEcon (2002), p. 75 ff. 
61 See DotEcon (2002), p. 63 ff. 
62 See DotEcon (2002), pp. 68 ff. 
63 See DotEcon (2002), p. 71. 
64 See DotEcon (2002), pp. 77 ff. 
65 See DotEcon (2002), p. 75. 
66 See DotEcon (2002), p. 84. 
67 See DotEcon (2002), pp. 79 ff. 
68 See DotEcon (2002), pp. 90 ff. 
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Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction formats seem most suitable for the allocation of airport 
slots. Because of its open format, bidders can observe each other’s behaviour and cross-check 
their own valuations. Combinatorial bidding can also be allowed to further reduce risks due to 
synergy between slots. Runway, gate and terminal capacity can be combined into flexible 
bundles and airlines can be required to nominate usage factors for a particular slot.69 
Experiences with SMRA formats at the auctioning of frequencies in the US and Europe show 
that the concrete auction design is frequently only developed in the course of time. The aim 
should therefore be to check an implemented auction model for its efficiency periodically in 
order to carry out necessary modifications. In conclusion, Table 3 summarizes advantages and 
disadvantages of the different auction models. 
 Allocative 
efficiency 
Time 
requirement 
Complemen-
tarity  
Collusion Transaction cost Endogenous 
capacity 
determination  
Infrastructural 
components 
GIP 
- -- -- - 0 - - 
RSB 
+ ++ + + -- - - 
Wolf 
++ - + - 0 + + 
DotEcon 
++ - + - - ++ ++ 
-- very bad, - bad, 0 neutral, + good, ++ very good 
Figure 3: Comparison of different auction models. 
Source: Author. 
 
3.3 Secondary trading 
Slot trading is a secondary allocation mechanism that can improve an initial allocation of 
airport slots. It can be used in conjunction with administrative and market approaches as well. 
The idea of tradable rights is not new in economic literature and is based on work by Coase 
(1960). In a market free of distortions (i.e. free of transaction costs) and with well defined 
property rights, the market will achieve economic efficiency regardless of the primary 
allocation. 
The aim of secondary trading is, as that of auctions, to allow the users with the highest 
willingness to pay to receive the slot and therefore guarantee an efficient allocation.70 The 
introduction of secondary trading would generate opportunistic prices at market price level for 
the incumbent slot users. If an inefficient primary allocation existed, gains from trade could be 
achieved. The market mechanism would assign the slots to the parties with the highest 
willingness to pay. An efficient allocation would result. Market entrance for potential 
                                                 
69 See DotEcon (2002), pp. 68 ff. 
70 See Ewers et al. (2001); CAA (2001); Knieps (1996a) and (2003). 
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competitors would be possible since they could buy slots and also observe a market price that 
reveals the cost of entry. Information required to identify an efficient investment level in 
airport infrastructure would be revealed. A contribution to infrastructure financing is, 
however, not made. 
While most economic scholars favour secondary trading, actual market design remains a topic 
for heated debate.71 At issue is who should be permitted to trade72 and whether trading should 
occur in a centrally organised or a bilateral market73. Should modern financial instruments 
such as options and futures be allowed?74 Other issues yet to be resolved include market 
transparency75 and the need for anonymous trading76. Another question is, whether terminal 
and stand capacities should also be included in trading and whether these infrastructural 
components should be unbundledly tradable.77 Another controversial point is whether slot 
trading can prevent slot hording. Therefore, the necessity of a “Use-It-Or-Lose-It” provision 
remains contentious.78 There is a very controversial debate about who “owns” airport slots.79 
Government, airlines, and airports have all claimed ownership. In an efficient market, clearly 
defined property rights would reduce uncertainty among market participants and promote 
trading. Since establishing ownership in airport slots might be difficult due to political and 
legal obstacles, tradable rights without freehold rights could be defined.80  
Experience with slot trading exists in the US at the four High Density Traffic Airports 
(HDTAs) Chicago O’Hare, New York LaGuardia, John F. Kennedy and Reagan Washington 
National. To a smaller extent, this also applies to the EU where non-monetary slot trading and 
a gray market exist.81 The US experience with slot trading will now be examined more 
intensely in order to draw some conclusions on the feasibility of secondary trading. 
Starting in April 1986, an FAA82 final rule (the so called “Buy-Sell Rule”) allowed the trading 
of slots at the four HDTAs.83 In the initial allocation, slots were grandfathered to the carriers 
which previously used them.84 Thereafter, slots became tradable and leasable without 
                                                 
71 See Nera (2003), p. 51; Knieps (1996a), p. 8; CAA (2001), pp. 14 ff. 
72 See Ewers et al. (2001), p. 25; CAA (2001), pp. 14ff. 
73 See DotEcon (2002), p. 91; Grether, Isaac and Plott (1989), p. 56; Wolf (1995), p. 54. 
74 See DotEcon (2002), p. 91. 
75 See CAA (2002), p. 21. 
76 See CAA (2001), p. 16; Nera (2003), p. 52. 
77 See CAA (2001), p. 17. 
78 See Ewers et al. (2001), p. 26; Knieps (1996a), pp. 11 ff. 
79 See Boyfield (2003), pp. 29 ff. 
80 See CAA (2001); NERA (2003). 
81 See Nera (2003), pp. 24 ff.; CAA (2001), p. 33; Boyfield (2003), pp. 35 ff. 
82  On April 1, 1967, FAA's name changed from Federal Aviation Agency to Federal Aviation Administration. 
83 FAR 14 CFR §93 subpart K, also see Hardaway (1986), p. 4; Czerny and Tegner (2002), pp. 5 ff. 
84 See FAR 14 CFR §93.215. 
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restriction by any party, including financial intermediaries.85 An organised central slot market 
was not established and did not accrue over time.86 Any slot not used for at least 65% of the 
time had to be returned to the FAA (“Use-It-Or-Lose-It Rule”), and was redistributed by 
lottery, with 25% of the slots distributed to new entrants.87 The FAA rule highlighted that 
slots were not considered property rights and that the FAA could withdraw and reallocate 
them for operational and competitive reasons.88  
In June 1999, the US House of Representatives passed the Aviation Investment and Reform 
Act for the 21st Century (H.R. 1000). The Act lifted all slot constraints at Chicago O’Hare 
from July 2002 on, and from JFK and LaGuardia beginning in 2007. Hence, the slot trading 
regime will be replaced by a first-come-first-serve principle.89 
The effects of the “Buy-Sell-Rule” on airline competition were extensively empirically 
analyzed by the General Accounting Office.90 The most recent analysis is of March 1999. The 
results of the study can be summarised as followed: 
1. At the four slot constrained airports, major established carriers have expanded their 
slot holdings. 
2. The slot share held by airlines that started after deregulation remains low. 
3. Airfares at the high-density airports are consistently higher than at airports of 
comparable size without slot constraints. 
At a first glance the above results seem to support the position of those opposed to secondary 
trading of airport slots. Higher concentration and higher fares could be the result of the 
airlines’ anticompetitive behaviour, i.e. hoarding of slots to keep competitive airlines out of 
the market and raise passenger fares to earn a monopoly premium.  
But neither higher concentration nor higher fares necessarily imply anticompetitive behaviour. 
They can also be the result of market efficiency. Kleit and Kobayashi (1996) argue that fares 
at slot constrained airports must be higher than at unconstrained airports, since fares must 
reflect the slots’ associated scarcity rent.91 Starkie (1994) additionally notes that higher fares 
might include a network premium.92 Secondly, Kleit and Kobayashi (1996) argue that high 
concentration might be a result of larger airlines being more efficient than smaller airlines. 
                                                 
85 See FAR 14 CFR §93.221(a). 
86 See Nera (2003), p. 128. 
87 In January 1993 the utilisation rate was modified to 80 percent. See FAR 14 CFR §93.227 and also Starkie 
(2003), p. 68. 
88 See FAR 14 CFR §93.223. 
89 See Czerny and Tegner (2002), p. 10. 
90 See GAO (1999), p. 91 for a list of GAO publications in this field from 1985 to 1999. 
91 See Kleit and Kobayashi (1996), pp. 5 ff. 
92 See Starkie (1998), p. 115. 
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High concentration might be the result of network effects associated with hub-airports. 
Thirdly, they argue that the high concentration at the four slot-restricted airports might 
overstate the potential for anticompetitive behavior, since each of them is located near one or 
more regional airports lacking slot constraints. Kleit and Kobayashi (1996) empirically 
analyzed the effects of the Buy-Sell-Rule using data from the airport O´Hare. Using slot usage 
data, regression analysis revealed a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
slot share and rate of use. The two largest air carriers at O’Hare were among the airlines that 
used slots the most intensely.93 This is inconsistent with anti-competitive abuse and supports a 
pro-competitive explanation of efficiency causing concentration. Secondly, dominant carriers 
were almost always found to be net lessees and not net lessors of slots at O´Hare.94 An anti-
competitive behaviour would imply a reciprocal result; airlines could avoid the sale of unused 
slots and hinder the market entry of potential competitors. Additionally, Kleit and Kobayashi 
analyzed the capacity usage of airlines, because anti-competitive slot hording would require 
dominant airlines to use small airplanes. Results based on capacity usage were ambiguous - 
allowing both hoarding and efficiency explanations.95 Overall results support a pro-
competitive explanation of concentration at O’Hare, and do not support the hypothesis that 
concentration at O’Hare caused anti-competitive behaviour. 
The results of Kleit and Kobayashi are supported by empirical work by Sened and Riker 
(1996) based on data from 1972-1981 and 1985-1989 from Washington Reagan and Chicago 
O’Hare. The data set contained observations on 15 carriers in two different airports for 16 
years.96 The effect of profitability was found to be significantly negative before and 
significantly positive after allowing slot trading.97 Most importantly, the analysis revealed that 
before secondary trading load factors had no effect on slot allocation while after 
implementing the rule there was a significant positive effect. The higher the load factor on 
each of an airline’s planes, the more likely it was to obtain new slots.98 Starting from the 
assumptions that profitability and load factor are good indicators of efficient slot use, Sened 
and Riker (1996) also support the efficiency-increasing effect of slot trading.  
 
                                                 
93 See Kleit and Kobayashi (1996), pp. 9 ff. and 13 ff. 
94 See Kleit and Kobayashi (1996), pp. 11 ff. 
95 See Kleit and Kobayashi (1996), pp. 18 ff. 
96 See Sened and Riker (1996), p. 435. 
97 See Sened and Riker (1996), pp. 436 ff. 
98 See Sened and Riker (1996), p. 438. 
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4 Comparison of the Instruments Including Elements of Positive Theory of Regulation 
The inefficiencies arising from today’s slot allocation both in the EU and the US (and 
worldwide) have been well known among economic scholars for decades.99 The current push 
for reform of the European Commission lets hope for chances of the implementation of 
market instruments. It has to be suspected, however, that economic criteria won't decide 
exclusively. Rather, the commission wants to analyze and take into account the expected 
effects of the implementation of different market instruments on different interest groups of 
the air traffic sector and on international air traffic besides competition-relevant aspects.100  
The Positive Theory of Regulation analyzes the persistence of inefficient regulation. It 
provides explanations for the emergence, application, supply and demand of regulation as 
well as for the phenomenon that even harmful regulation to the society is not removed.101 
Private pressure groups have influence on the air traffic policy.  
Fundamental work on pressure groups was done by Olson (1965). The starting point of 
Olson´s theory is that free riding also plays an important part in the organisation of interests, 
i.e. potential members try to profit from lobbying without contributing themselves.102 An 
important application of Olson´s theory results from the comparison of organizability of 
producers´ vs. consumers´ interests. It can be assumed, that producers´ interests are better 
organizable. Reasons are: 
1. The number of producers of a good is smaller than the number of consumers. 
2. The consumers´ interests are more concentrated because specialization occurs in 
production, but not in consumption. (Political) change of a single price therefore has a 
large influence on the budget of this good´s producers, but only a slight influence on 
every consumer´s budget.  
Therefore, the fundamental problem of free riding is much smaller on the producers´ side than 
on the consumers´. This implies that pressure groups of airlines and airports have a greater 
influence on economic decision makers than consumer lobbies. 
An implementable slot allocation regime must be compatible with national, European and 
international law. The Chicago Convention, bilateral air traffic agreements, as well as the 
European Open-Sky Rules have to be considered among others. A new allocation mechanism 
has to be consistent with the IATA Schedule, especially. To judge the implementation 
                                                 
99 See e.g. Koran and Ogur (1983); Knieps (1987). 
100 See European Commission (2001b), p. 2. 
101 See Köberlein (1997), p. 132. 
102 See Olson (1992), p. 8. 
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chances of different market mechanisms, the effects on the different pressure groups and the 
consistency with the existing institutional framework will therefore be of great importance. 
Optimal user charges require a surcharge on the marginal costs of the infrastructure in height 
of the delay costs and, if there is a shortage, of scarcity rent.103 The ICAO104 Policies on 
Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services require that airport fees are cost-related.105 
Similar prescriptions are contained in bilateral agreements, for example between EU member 
states and the US.106 These would have to be renegotiated once optimal user charges are 
introduced. Although the ICAO rule isn't legally obligatory, it creates considerable moral 
pressure and might therefore hamper the necessary negotiations.107 The distribution effect of 
optimal user charges depends on to whom the revenues are awarded. If capacity is 
expandable, they should be awarded to the airports since only they can invest in the required 
infrastructural extensions.108 As shown above, the revenue will exactly equal the optimal 
investment level if constant economies of scale exist. If the delay and scarcity surcharges 
were awarded to the airports, it could be expected that these would support such charges. The 
windfall profit would be withdrawn from the incumbent airlines, however. Therefore, there is 
a good chance for heavy resistance of incumbent airways against the introduction of optimal 
user charges. New entrants, however, frequently offer their services at not capacity-
constrained less central airports.109 They would consequently profit from the introduction of 
optimal charges since the cost difference between the use of capacity-constrained and non-
coordinated airports increases.  
The introduction of auctions would require the withdrawal of grandfather rights. Therefore, a 
modification or abolition of the present EC directive 95/93 would be necessary.110 The 
question whether grandfather rights imply ownership rights remains controversial in 
literature.111 At least incumbents will have some rights due to protection of confidence.112 
Therefore compensation payments would be required if grandfather rights would be 
withdrawn without notice.113 Relatively long transition periods therefore become 
mandatory.114 Moreover, auctions would oblige the renegotiation of some bilateral air traffic 
agreements that are based on the IATA allocation proceedings, including grandfather 
                                                 
103 See section 3.1. 
104 International Civil Aviation Organization 
105 See ICAO (2001), Art. 21 and 22; also: Nera (2003), p. 40; Bass (2003), p.88. 
106 See Nera (2003), p. 40. 
107 See Nera (2003), p. 40. 
108 See section 2. 
109 See e.g. Ryanair serving less central airports such as Altenburg, Frankfurt Hahn and London Stenstead. 
110 See Nera (2003), p. 46. 
111 See Boyfield (2003), pp. 22 ff. 
112 See Ewers et al. (2001), p. 9. 
113 See Tegner (2002), p. 111 and bibliographical references there. 
114 See Ewers et al. (2001), p. 13. 
 17
rights.115 Incumbent airways can be expected to strongly oppose this market instrument since 
they want to protect their priviliged position. New airlines would gain access to required 
infrastructure. Airways which predominantly use not capacity-limited airports would profit 
from auctions. If revenues would be awarded to airports, airports would also gain from the 
introduction of auctions. If this were not the case, they would very likely oppose the 
introduction of this instrument because the status quo does not include any punctuality 
guarantee which could lead to compensation payments. In this scenario, they would be 
interested in the retention of the present regulation. 
The introduction of a secondary slot market requires a modification of EC directive 95/93 
since it forbids the monetary trade of slots.116 The award of clearly defined property rights 
would promote the efficiency of this mechanism. However, as the US experience reveals, it is 
not absolutely required. Except for this there are no further legal modifications required.117 If 
a slot market should be implemented under retention of the present grandfather rights, then 
there would be a good chance for lower resistance of incumbenet airways. Revenues for the 
financing of new infrastructure, however, could not be obtained. The airport operators can 
therefore be expected to be more sceptical about slot trading than about auctions and optimal 
user charges. Altogether, this mechanism seems to be most easily implementable because of 
the little requirement for legal modification and distribution effects. 
The following figure summarizes the results of the analysis of the three market mechanisms. 
 Allocative 
Efficiency 
Symmetrical 
access 
Infrastructural 
efficiency 
Transaction 
costs 
Legal 
consequence 
Distribution 
effect 
Optimal 
charges 
+ + + - - - 
Slot trading + - - + + + 
Auctions + + + - - - 
- bad, + good 
Figure 4: Comparison of different allocation mechanisms. 
Source: Author. 
 
5 Conclusion and outlook 
Airlines require access to airport infrastructure, specifically to runways, gates, and terminals, 
in order to offer their services. The lack of an efficient upstream market for airport capacity 
will harm overall performance of all players in the airline industry. The Buy-Sell Rule 
                                                 
115 See Boyfield (2003), pp. 47 ff. 
116 See Nera (2003), p. 52. 
117  See Nera (2003), p. 52. 
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implemented in 1986, which would make the allocation of scarce airport capacity possible, 
gained world-wide attention for being the first real-world experience using market 
mechanisms. There is evidence that the US market for airport slots increased overall market 
efficiency. Market failure resulting in anti-competitive behavior of incumbent airlines cannot 
be proved. The misconceptions about the results of the US experience in secondary trading 
are likely to reduce chances of implementing efficient market-based allocation systems in the 
US and world-wide. 
Today, airport slots do not correspond to the concept of public goods any more, but are linked 
to shortage and externality. Administrative allocation mechanisms are unable to ensure an 
efficient allocation and a discrimination-free market access. The requirement for 
implementing market instruments therefore arises. Slot trading is relativly simple to 
implement and can lead to an efficient allocation of airport slots. Regarding discrimination-
free access and an efficient financing of infrastructure, optimal user charges and auctions are 
superior. However, they lead to higher distributional effects and require an adjustment of EU 
and bilateral law. The choice of the allocation mechanism will therefore not only be 
influenced by economic reasons but will also depend on the "courage" of the politicians. 
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